Following the chaotic Copenhagen conference of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), policymakers and pundits have discussed the G-20 as an alternative forum for advancing climate change diplomacy. This paper assesses the risks and rewards of tackling climate change in the G-20 and finds that despite its seeming attractiveness, the G-20, as structured, is not a suitable replacement for the UN-led process and has limited ability, at present, to advance climate change negotiations. There is much, however, that the G-20 can do to contribute to the goals of the climate negotiations outside of wading into the negotiations themselves. Building on its existing agenda the G-20 has the power to significantly reduce global greenhouse gas emissions, accelerate the deployment of clean energy technology, and help vulnerable countries adapt to a warmer world through the mobilization of public and private finance. Following through on the existing G-20 pledge to phase out and rationalize inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, establishing new green guidelines for multilateral development banks, coordinating green stimulus exit strategies, promoting open markets for environmental goods and services, and rebalancing global economic growth all fall well within the G-20's mandate and help meet the climate challenge.
The modest Copenhagen Accord, cobbled together by a group of key leaders in the final hours of the conference, could not garner unanimous support and thus exists as a voluntary agreement with no legal standing under the UNFCCC. Many parties and observers left the conference wondering whether the UNFCCC process can ever deliver a meaningful international solution to climate change if any one state, no matter how small, has the ability to block. Wouldn't it make more sense to hammer out an agreement among a select group of large countries, such as the Group of Twenty (G-20)?
The question comes at a critical time in the G-20's evolution. Though in existence since 1999, the G-20 became the premier international economic forum only in 2008 in response to the global financial crisis. As global growth gets back on track, the G-20's challenge is transitioning from a crisis responder to a systemic manager. This will inevitably broaden the G-20 agenda, and leaders will need to identify issues where the forum can be of particular use and avoid issues the group is poorly suited to address.
This working paper assesses the potential risks and rewards of tackling climate change in the G-20 and finds that despite its seeming attractiveness as an alternative venue for climate change diplomacy, the G-20, as structured, is not a suitable replacement for the UN-led process and has limited ability, at present, to advance climate change negotiations. At the same time, significant progress in reducing emissions can be achieved directly through existing elements of the G-20 agenda, and the group has the potential to play a pivotal role in advancing international climate change cooperation down the road.
WhAt's holdIng up InternAtIonAl clImAte tAlks?
The outcome of the Copenhagen COP surprised many observers given the positive domestic policy movement in key countries in the run-up to the summit. A change of government in Australia, Japan, and the United States brought about more ambitious emissions reduction targets in all three countries.
Large emerging economies, including People's Rep. of China (China), India, Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia, all announced nationwide emissions reduction goals for the first time ever and began implementing domestic policy to achieve these targets. And bilateral meetings between large emitters, as well 3 as the Major Economies Forum leaders' meeting in July 2009, produced communiqués highlighting the importance of international cooperation on climate change (Houser 2010 ).
The problem came in translating unilateral domestic action and bilateral and plurilateral pronouncements into a tangible multilateral agreement. The 1994 UNFCCC categorizes countries into "developed" (those listed in Annex I of the treaty) and "developing" (those not listed in Annex I) based on their economic status when the treaty was negotiated. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol solidified this distinction, mandating emissions cuts for Annex I countries only. This asymmetry precluded ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by the United States. The US Congress made clear in the run-up to the Kyoto summit that they would only accept a climate treaty in which large emerging economies committed to reducing emissions alongside developed countries, though the nature and ambition of those reductions could be differentiated based on capability.
1 As the Kyoto Protocol failed this test, it was never ratified in Washington.
Without the United States on board, participation in the Kyoto Protocol has become increasingly politically unacceptable for other developed counties. And given the rapid growth in emissions from emerging economies since 1997, the Protocol is inadequate to limit global temperature increases to 2 degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels, which the scientific community believes is critical to avoid the worst effects of climate change. Finally, the Kyoto Protocol provides only limited financing for adaptation, an important issue for the poorest and most vulnerable developing countries. As a result, when the parties to the UNFCCC met in Bali in 2007 they endeavored to negotiate more than a simple extension of the Kyoto Protocol beyond its initial 2007-12 commitment period. The Bali Action Plan launched a "comprehensive process to enable the full, effective and sustained implementation of the Convention through long-term cooperative action, now, up to and beyond 2012" (UNFCCC 2007). The Bali Action
Plan envisioned an "agreed outcome" in Copenhagen that would include mitigation commitments or actions by both developed and developing countries, provisions for the measurement, reporting, and verification (MRV) of these commitments or actions, efforts to reduce deforestation, cooperation on technology, and financial support for both adaptation and mitigation.
The parties left Bali with strong differences of opinion on how each of these issues should be addressed. And the term "agreed outcome" glossed over sharp disagreement on what legal form such an "outcome" should take. While some progress was made on technology and deforestation between Bali and Copenhagen, there was little, or even backward, movement on other issues. The sharpest disagreement centered around the following:
Legal Form: While recognizing that countries' mitigation commitments will vary given their level of economic development, the United States' position is that those commitments should be legally it's unlikely to do so again. As a result, the G-20, self-identified as the "premier forum" for international economic cooperation, will likely be the only ongoing plurilateral leaders' process with both developed and developing countries at the table and a mandate that could extend to climate change. The core issues at play in the climate negotiations will ultimately need leaders' attention to unlock (as was the case with the Copenhagen Accord) and the G-20 could be instrumental in that process. In addition, addressing climate change alongside other G-20 agenda items potentially opens up new pathways to a deal not possible in the more narrowly focused UNFCCC setting.
the chAllenges And rIsks of puttIng clImAte on the g-20 AgendA
While attractive on many levels, the G-20 also has some significant shortcomings as a forum for addressing climate change. Though the group accounts for the majority of global emissions, it excludes countries most vulnerable to the impact of climate change. None of the 49 countries the UN categorizes as LDCs or the 39 countries that negotiate collectively in the UN as the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) has a seat at the table and only one African country (South Africa) is represented. LDCs, AOSIS, and the African Group are critical constituencies in climate negotiations, and any deal struck in their absence may lack credibility and be criticized by those outside the G-20 umbrella. This is particularly true on issues of climate finance as these groups will likely receive the lion's share of future financial flows.
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To tackle the negotiations directly, the G-20 would first need to establish a G-20+ process for climate change that included representatives from vulnerable country groupings. The G-20 would also need to approach the negotiating agenda in a balanced manner. The Copenhagen Accord addressed all four of the negotiations: mitigation (including transparency and forestry), finance, adaptation, and technology. In particular, it was the balanced treatment of transparency (important to developed countries) and finance (important to developing countries) that made the Accord possible. Advancing one of these issues through the G-20 but not the other risks weakening the prospects of a comprehensive deal.
But the right group of countries and right approach to the negotiating agenda won't, in and of itself, deliver a climate change agreement. The fact that six countries-Sudan, Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Tuvalu-were able to prevent the 194-member COP from adopting the Copenhagen Accord left many with the impression that the principal impediments to progress in UNFCCC negotiations are the number of actors and the need for consensus. In fact it's the fundamental differences in the negotiating positions of G-20 countries themselves that lie at the core of the current UNFCCC stalemate. While G-20 countries were instrumental in drafting the Copenhagen Accord, opinions within the group vary as to the agreement's importance. Some countries see it both as an operational agreement in and of itself and as a template for a future binding agreement. For example, in its first submission to the UNFCCC following the Copenhagen summit, the United States stated, "the Copenhagen Accord is expressly operational and calls for work to be carried out in a number of areas that should be launched without delay. At the same time, we would welcome a further formalization of the Accord in Mexico"
(UNFCCC 2010).
Others see it more as a political declaration, pieces of which can be incorporated into the existing UNFCCC negotiations on an ad hoc basis. China, for example, submitted to the UNFCCC that "the political agreement in the Copenhagen Accord may be considered and where appropriate, be translated into texts that can be incorporated in the negotiating text" (UNFCCC 2010).
And some G-20 countries not included in the drafting of the Copenhagen Accord reject its validity as a document. Saudi Arabia, for example, has stated that "since the 'Copenhagen Accord has not been formally adopted, it has no legal status within the UNFCCC, and thus can't be used as basis or reference for further negotiations" (UNFCCC 2010).
As a result, there is significant risk that marrying climate change and the G-20 will end up introducing the acrimony of the UN negotiations into G-20 discussions rather than bringing the civility of the G-20 to climate change diplomacy. This is a risk worth taking to unlock the climate talks, as only a leaders' process can do, when conditions are ripe for a deal. But a premature foray into the negotiations could weaken the G-20's status and hamper progress on other critical issues on the group's agenda. G-20 countries account for just under half of the IEA's estimate of fossil fuel consumption subsidies globally (IEA 2010a). In Toronto, twelve G-20 countries offered strategies and timetables for rationalizing and phasing out fossil fuel subsidies, but only three countries included plans for consumption subsidies specifically: Argentina, Indonesia, and Mexico (Table 2 ). These three, while important sources of consumption subsidies based on the IEA's price-gap analysis, account for only 24 percent of total G-20 consumption subsidies. In addition, their implementation strategies were limited to a subset of the total subsidies identified by the IEA. For example, Argentina pledged to phase out liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) subsidies as natural gas becomes more readily available, but the IEA estimates that natural gas accounts for more than half of Argentina's consumption subsidies.
India, which accounts for 17 percent of the IEA's estimated G-20 consumption subsidies, has established an Eminent Group of Ministers to recommend a strategy for rationalizing and phasing out inefficient petroleum consumption subsidies. India will presumably report to the G-20 once the strategy is developed, though Delhi has indicated that kerosene and LPG subsidies may not be covered.
Russia, which accounts for 20 percent of the IEA's estimated G-20 consumption subsidies, has said that inefficient fossil fuel subsidies will be rationalized and phased out as part of its Energy Strategy 2030
and Concept of Long-Term Social and Economic Development till 2020 but hasn't provided any specifics.
China, which accounts for 17 percent of the IEA's estimated G-20 consumption subsidies, has neither identified any domestic consumption subsidies nor offered a plan for phasing them out. Saudi Arabia and South Africa, which account for the remaining 22 percent of the IEA's estimate, have stated that they do not have any consumption subsidies.
For developed countries, fossil fuel subsidies generally exist on the production rather than consumption side. Estimates of the scale of production subsidies are much thinner than consumption subsidies. The Global Subsidies Initiative's estimate of $100 billion is based on disparate country studies with varying methodologies (GSI 2009). The majority of production subsidies likely exist in developed countries. EarthWatch estimated that in 2003, US producer subsidies totaled $37 billion to $64 billion.
Greenpeace estimated that in the late 1990s, EU production subsidies were greater than $10 billion per year.
Among developed G-20 countries, Australia, France, Japan, and the United Kingdom denied the existence of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies in their countries, either on the consumption or production side. Canada, Germany, Italy, Korea, Russia, Turkey, and the United States all offered rationalization and phaseout plans for production subsidies of varying scope, ambition, and specificity. China also pledged to phase out one fossil fuel subsidy on the production side. The IEA estimates cover all subsidies, not just "inefficient" subsidies, which is the focus of the G-20
goal. Considerable work must also be done to develop a common definition and robust assessment of fossil fuel production subsidies, as these are more important for the G-20's developed-country members.
The mandate of the G-20 Energy Experts Group should be extended and expanded to attempt to address these definitional issues so that G-20 members can put forward a qualitative inventory of domestic subsidy policies that's consistent with quantitative assessments of the extent of subsidies in those countries. Only with commonly agreed definitions will the G-20 be able to monitor progress of individual members in implementing their domestic strategies and assess the progress of the group in meeting its collective target.
In addition to tracking countries' domestic subsidy strategies, the G-20 should identify sectors where coordinated international action will allow for greater domestic ambition. For example, attempts to phase out subsidies to oil and gas producers in country X will likely face domestic resistance out of concerns that doing so unilaterally will only push production to other countries, making country X more dependent on imported oil. Coordinated action between G-20 countries would help address these concerns.
reform of InternAtIonAl fInAncIAl InstItutIons
At the moment, most multilateral climate finance flows through the multilateral development banks This often results in highly contentious public disputes over whether the MDBs should fund specific projects given their environmental profile, rather than MDB staff receiving clear blanket guidance from their boards on which types of projects are acceptable and which aren't. (Table 3 ). This funding has been the dominant driver of domestic energy and climate policy in G-20 countries over the past two years and has pushed global clean energy research and development budgets to historic highs in 2009 after three decades of steady decline (Figure 1) . As the G-20 turns its attention to fiscal consolidation, the global energy and environmental policy landscape will change considerably.
recommendation
As the G-20 discusses when and how to end the current fiscal expansion, special attention should be paid to energy and environmental spending. The G-20 has highlighted the importance of policy coordination as countries roll back stimulus programs. This is doubly true for climate-related stimulus programs. Clean energy is a global market, and firms will be able to achieve greater cost reductions if the largest markets Fiscal expansion in G-20 countries following the Washington summit, however, was accompanied by a suite of trade policies that violated this pledge, not least in the energy and environmental space. The financial crisis coupled with growing public skepticism in several countries about the science of climate change has made industrial policy and job creation more important political drivers of clean energy deployment in most parts of the world than energy security or environmental concerns. As a result, there is strong political pressure in many countries to ensure that taxpayer funding for clean energy deployment goes exclusively to domestic clean technology companies. And while discriminatory trade policies tied to stimulus dollars will fade as countries transition to fiscal consolidation, this emerging "space race" framing of the energy and climate challenge will ensure that protectionism will remain an issue in energy and climate policymaking for years to come.
Poorly managed, this trend could raise the cost of clean energy technology for all countries and hamper efforts to address climate change. Globalization of clean energy supply chains has the potential to significantly reduce technology costs, which in turn will mitigate the economic impact of a transition to a low-carbon economy. But concern over jobs losses in the clean energy products and services where individual countries are not competitive and uncertainty about foreign markets for the products and services in which they are many governments opting for a strategy of home-market protection, which results in either higher energy prices or lower levels of clean energy deployment. Making open markets consistent with countries' domestic clean energy-related economic and employment goals requires a new framework for international trade and investment in the energy and environmental space.
In Seoul, the G-20 should set out to develop a Green Trade and Investment Framework (GTIF). Such a framework would cover a full and balanced set of energy-and environment-related trade and investment issues in G-20 countries to create a level playing field in the development and deployment of affordable climate-friendly technology, including n tariff barriers, n clean energy technology production subsidies, n local content requirements, n intellectual property rights enforcement, n codes and standards, and n foreign investment approvals.
14 Many of these issues are currently being addressed in other forums, including the Doha Round.
The GTIF would not replace these processes but rather be a nonbinding framework guiding the domestic policy of G-20 countries, which account for the majority of clean energy producers and consumers.
bAlAnced groWth
In Washington, the G-20 identified global economic imbalances as contributing to the financial crisis, and emerging from the crisis with more balanced global growth has become a top G-20 agenda item. The IMF could enlist the IEA's analytical support in this exercise and provide a joint report to the G-20 at the 2011 summit. This would not only help build political support for the rebalancing agenda but it also highlight the most effective rebalancing policies from an energy and environmental perspective.
conclusIon
While the G-20 may appear to be an attractive alternative to the unwieldy UNFCCC process for advancing international cooperation on climate change, it is certainly no silver bullet for unlocking climate talks. Vulnerable countries would need to be represented in some capacity at the G-20 for any agreement to have any credibility outside the group, and the climate agenda would need to be approached in a balanced manner (e.g., giving equal attention to transparency and climate finance) to avoid inadvertently hampering progress in official climate talks. Even if the G-20 were able to meet these two tests, the group is unlikely to be able to achieve a breakthrough on the most important issues in the negotiations at present because of stark differences in the positions of G-20 countries and the state of domestic policy in some key Proposes to phase out subsidies to anthracite coal and briquette producers.
Mexico 23 By continuing current policies and based on current market conditions, subsidies to gasoline, diesel, and liquefied petroleum gas are expected to disappear in the medium term.
Russia 52
Proposes to implement the commitment to rationalize and phase out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies through national economic and energy policy.
Saudi Arabia Proposes to work on a restructuring plan to rationalize the inefficient producer subsidies transferred to a stated-owned hard coal producing enterprise.
United States
Proposes to pass legislation to eliminate 12 preferential tax provisions related to the production of coal, oil, and natural gas. 
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